Metric for Security Activities assisted by Argumentative Logic by Bouyahia, Tarek et al.
Metric for Security Activities assisted by Argumentative
Logic
Tarek Bouyahia, Muhammad Sabir Idrees, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia, Fre´de´ric
Cuppens, Fabien Autrel
To cite this version:
Tarek Bouyahia, Muhammad Sabir Idrees, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia, Fre´de´ric Cuppens, Fabien
Autrel. Metric for Security Activities assisted by Argumentative Logic. SETOP 2014 : the
7th International Workshop on Autonomous and Spontaneous Security, Sep 2014, Wroclaw,




Submitted on 19 Jan 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.

Metric for Security Activities assisted by
Argumentative Logic
Tarek Bouyahia, Muhammad Sabir Idrees, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia,
Fre´de´ric Cuppens, and Fabien Autrel
Telecom Bretagne, 2 rue de la chaˆtaigneraie,
Cesson Se´vigne´, France
Abstract. Recent security concerns related to future embedded systems
make enforcement of security requirements one of the most critical phases
when designing such systems. This paper introduces an approach for effi-
cient enforcement of security requirements based on argumentative logic,
especially reasoning about activation or deactivation of different security
mechanisms under certain functional and non-functional requirements.
In this paper, the argumentative logic is used to reason about the ratio-
nale behind dynamic enforcement of security policies.
Keywords: Argumentative logic, Reasoning, Complex attack, Reaction
policies.
1 Introduction
Designing a secure system has always been a complex exercise. In practice, much
of the focus for designers and developers being on delivering a working system in
the first place; on the other hand, security concerns have long been considered
only in retrospect, especially after serious flaws are discovered. Security experts
are thus generally confronted with an existing system, whose architecture might
actually hamper the deployment of security mechanisms that would prevent the
occurrence of the attacks they envision. On the contrary, the challenges of mod-
ern security tools is to keep the system in a safe state while maintaining the best
possible level of performance and quality of service. From the embedded system
viewpoint, enforcement of security requirements becomes even more challenging
and more critical. These challenges stem from the tight relationship between
architecture design and its functional, and non-functional requirements as well
as their impact on one another. For instance, if the system architecture design
changes or evolves, these requirements should meet the new architecture design
objectives and choose the best countermeasure that can be applied in this spe-
cific context or situation. This is especially true in safety-critical systems such as
automotive systems [6,13], where attacks may be devastating, but where secu-
rity functions overhead may also result in an absolutely useless system. In such a
context, designing a secure system has always been a complex exercise. Indeed,
security is a functionality that is difficult to specify and implement because it is
2 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
not modular: modifications to one part of an application may interact strongly
with the security properties of other parts of the same application.
In this paper, we present an approach that solves these problems. This approach
is driven by argumentative logic (AL)[8]. It describes a structured collabora-
tion and interrelationship between the system architecture design and security
requirements to support the long-term needs of the system. The purpose of secu-
rity activities assisted by argumentative logic is to bring into focus the key areas
of concern, highlighting the decision criteria and security context for each system
aspect that has direct or indirect value for a stakeholder. We also claim that the
security analysis should also play an important role with respect to convincing
the designer of increasingly complex embedded systems of the consistency and
exhaustivity of his reasoning and selection of security measures, at least with
respect to the identified threats. The use of argumentative logic driven reason-
ing engine can help in dynamic enforcement of security mechanisms through the
introduction of non-monotonic reasoning capabilities. This capability opens up
the door to the dynamic selection and enforcement of security mechanisms per-
formed statically only today.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a case study from an
automotive domain we use throughout the paper. Section 3 goes around works
already done within the scope of this paper. Section 4 explains our approach for
dynamic enforcement of security requirements assisted by argumentative logic.
We show deployment scenario highlighting how an argumentative logic driven
reasoning engine, which makes it easier to dynamically enforce security mecha-
nisms in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2 Motivation example for Efficient Security Enforcement
In order to give an example of potential need for dynamic enforcement of security
requirements to control different security activities, we consider the following ab-
stract example of automotive on-board system. A modern automotive on-board
network interconnects a hundred of microcontrollers, termed Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) organized into application-specific domains bridge by gateways, as
shown in Figure 1. Attacks have been shown to be quite feasible [9] by bypassing
the filtering performed between domains or by brute-forcing ECU cryptography-
based protection mechanisms. Such attacks may in practice originate from the
Internet connection increasingly available in vehicles or even from the Bluetooth
pairing of a compromised mobile phone to the vehicle on-board network. Fur-
ther attacks are anticipated in upcoming Car2X applications, which will feature
vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. Many security at-
tacks and vulnerabilities are due to the fact that either security policy is not well
specified and enforced or system-wide security policies (dependencies between
different security policies) are too weak. Automotive on-board architectures do
not only rely on the simple enforcement of security rules but also involve multiple
enforcement points, especially when the underlying platforms and infrastructures
are providing services themselves, like HSM, or middleware layers. For instance,
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Fig. 1. Automotive on-board network architecture [11]
the security policy to be applied in a vehicle is the combination of an invariant
policy for the usage control of cryptographic credentials of Electronic Control
Units (ECU), and a flexible networking security policy. The credential usage
control policy is enforced by the HSM and possibly through the virtualization of
the ECUs if applications on the same ECU have to be segregated. In contrast,
the networking security policy is enforced by all network elements. Moreover,
the access control architecture must also allow enforcement of rules that limit
the traffic on the buses under consideration, based on trusted authentication
or other security mechanisms like traffic filtering or secure logging. However, as
highlighted in the previous section, the enforcement of these different security
mechanisms depends on a specific event or situation. For instance, while com-
municating with external entities like vehicle-to-infrastructure, it is preferable
to apply the traffic filtering rules to limit the computation load on the HSM,
which is responsible for the verification of cryptographic operations. Applying
such rules will eventually increase the performance of on-board system. How-
ever, always applying such kind of rules is not desirable, as the enforcement of
rules requires that the vehicle is in a specific context as well as a specific security
event is active. To dynamically enforce these different sets of security policies, we
call these policies as reaction policies [3]. In an on-board architecture, we need
a system in which policy enforcement decisions are based on specific arguments
in order to attain more fine grained enforcement of security policies.
3 Related Work
Based on the general idea of the platform in [8], the authors in [5] use the log-
ical argumentation to support generation of the low-level rules from high-level
policies. In [4] the authors treat the problem of resolving the possible anomalies
in firewall policies using Argumentation for Logic Programming with Priorities
(LPP). The use of this framework allows preferences to be encoded, thus allow-
ing complex reasoning over the relative priorities between rules. The framework
presented by Applebaum in [2] differentiates itself from these last two references
through the introduction of the rationales behind each argument in the policy.
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Applebaum propose to resolve conflictual situations in firewall policies by defin-
ing a potential ordering of the rationales behind each argument (rule). Firewall
can then resolve anomalies and conflictual rules through this order of priorites.
In [2] Applebaum defines a static order of priorities for the rationales behind
the firewall rules. However, administrators can decide in specific cases to change
the order of rationales priority. For instance, giving “allow legitimate senders”
rationale a higher priority than “allow programs”. In this case, firewall admin-
strators are obliged to update the firewall configuration for each required change
in order priorities. Argumentation has also received attention in the community
of multi-agent systems in recent years, with a particular interest in the use of
argumentative models from the informal logic viewpoint such as that by Wal-
ton and Krabbe [12,15]. Additionnaly, Bench-Capon introduces the value-based
framework in [7], and he extends it in [10] to provide meta-arguments to reason
about preference levels. However, current AL approaches target the system from
the static viewpoint, while ignoring any dynamic change in the system state or
security event, during system evolution.
4 Argumentative Logic-driven Reasoning Engine
In our approach, we design an argumentative framework allowing the automa-
tion of adapting priorities order, according to the current security situation and
building the security metric. To achieve this goal, our approach can be summa-
rized in the following three steps :
- For each security event, we define the rationale behind each possible coun-
termeasure.
- According to the contextual values and depending on security events, we
build the security metric which define the order between rationales.
- In case of conflict between countermeasures, we reason about the risk analysis
to decide which countermeasure is more important to apply.
In this section, we will define the role of different parts involved in the architec-
ture described in Figure 2 and the relations between them.
4.1 Security Policies
We start by defining the reaction policies, which presents the knowledge base
of security policies defined by the target organization. The reasoning module
performs the mapping between the collected information and security policies in
order to identify the rules that match. Reaction security policies are presented
as sets of rules in which we define the list of possible countermeasure for possible
security events that may occur in system evolution. We present in Table 1 some
examples of countermeasures for some security events according to automotive
system case [1]. The functional experts are responsible for giving rationales for
different countermeasure introduced in the security policy. These rationales are
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Fig. 2. Architecture of system detection & reaction
defined to express the result of the application of each countermeasure on the
system. In the Policy Administration Point (PAP) part, we assign to each rule
defined in the policy, the rationale behind it. For instance, we attribute “perfor-
mance” as a rationale for the countermeasure “Reduce frequency of beaconing
and other repeated messages” when “message saturation” threat occurs. Accord-
ing to the contextual values and depending on security events, we build in the
PAP the security metric which defines the priorities order between rationales.
According to the security and contextual information collected by the data col-
lection part, the Policy Decision point (PDP) refers to the reasoning module to
choose, among the rules introduced into security policies, the suitable rule to
apply(e.g., if “performance” rationale has the highest priority in the context on
which the “message saturation” threat was executed, the PDP choose “Reduce
frequency of beaconing and other repeated messages”). Finally, the decision will
be applied at the level of the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) of the targeted
system component. In complex system, the PEP is integrated in all the system
components, to enforce the reasoning engine decision in the relevant component.
4.2 Reasoning Engine
In order to ensure system security, policy reactions must maintain a certain level
of intelligence and dynamicity. Those properties allow security systems, accord-
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Threats Countermeasure
Message saturation
Reduce frequency of beaconing and other
repeated messages
Add source identification (IP address
equivalent) in V2V messages
Limit message traffic to V2I/I2V and im-
plement station registration
Manipulation of relayed ITS messages en
route
Plausibility checks on incoming messages
Include a non-cryptographic checksum of
the message in each message sent
Remove requirements for message relay in
the ITS BSA
Wormhole attacks
Use INS or existing dead-reckoning meth-
ods (with regular - but possibly infrequent
- GNSS corrections) to provide positional
data
Implement differential monitoring on the
GNSS system to identify unusual changes
in position
Use broadcast time (Universal Coordi-
nated Time - UTC - or GNSS) to times-
tamp all messages
Table 1. Potential security countermeasures to threats in an ITS system [1]
ing to a specific security situation, to choose the best countermeasures to apply
from the security metric. At the same time, the system enforces security condi-
tions and a better efficiency of execution. Many approaches use argumentative
logic (AL) [2] to provide rationales behind security policies. However, current AL
approaches typically target the system from the static viewpoint and developed
the metric of arguments, while ignoring any dynamic change in the system state
or security event, during system evolution. To do this, security tools must have
intelligent reasoning capabilities as the one of the human brain. To develop an
approach for dynamic policy reactions, we inspire from the human way of ar-
guing. Argumentation has been shown to be a useful framework for formalizing
non-monotonic reasoning. It is a branch of logic that enables reasoning about
the arguments to resolve inconsistencies in logic theory.
Argumentative logic
An argumentation system is a way for an agent to manage conflicting infor-
mation and draw conclusions. In an abstract argumentation system, the basic
information is a set of abstract arguments, which may for example represent
a given proposal, and conflicts between arguments are represented by a binary
relation on the set of arguments. For two arguments A and B, the meaning
of attacks(A,B) is that A represents an attack on B. We also say that a set
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of arguments S attacks an argument B if B is attacked by an argument in S.
We rely on the Dung’s [6] definition of an argumentation logic, which states that:
Definition 1:
An argumentation framework is a pair AF = < AR, attacks >
Where AR is a set of arguments and attacks is a binary relation on AR, i.e.
attacks ⊆ ARXAR.
Dung introduces also the notion of acceptability of arguments. An accepted
argument, in a set of arguments, is the one that every attack on it is rebutted
by an accepted argument form the set.
Definition 2:
An argument A ∈ AR is acceptable with respect to set of arguments S (accept-
able(A,S)), if:
(∀x)((x ∈ AR)&(attacks(x,A))→ (∃y)(y ∈ S)&attacks(y, x).
In security policies, we consider that each attack on a rule implemented in the
policy is rebutted by itself because attack relation is considered as symetric
from reaction security point of view. Thus, each security rule implemented in
security policy is accepted. To adapt the argumentation system to the security
requirements, we consider security policies as arguments. In addition, we define
a relation of attack between arguments (rules), two or more different possible
countermeasures that can be applied for a specific security event. For instance,
in the automotive case, three different countermeasures are presented according
to the “Message saturation” security threat as shown in Table 1. Based on the
above mentioned Definition 1, these countermeasures represent two arguments
that attack each other because we are in a conflicting situation and we need to
choose the suitable countermeasure among them. In our approach, we define the
conflict between independent countermeasures according to a specified threat as
following:
Definition 3:
∀A ∈ T, ∀X1, X2 ∈ CA
conflict independent(X1, X2)← countermeasure(X1)∧countermeasure(X2).
Where T present the set of all the threats and CA is the set of possible counter-
measures according to threat A.
Attack relation may also occur between two or more different arguments, ac-
cording to different threats, that the system is unable to apply at the same time
as described in section 5.1. We define the conflict between dependent counter-
measures according to two threats as following:
Definition 4:
∀A,B ∈ T, ∀X1 ∈ CA and ∀X2 ∈ CB
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conflict dependent(X1, X2)← countermeasure(X1)∧ countermeasure(X2)∧
dependent(X1, X2).
Where T present the set of all the threats, CA is the set of possible countermea-
sures according to threat A, CB is the set of possible countermeasures according
to threat B, and dependent(X1, X2) is the predicate that inform the system
about the dependence between countermeasures.
4.3 Risk determination
The purpose of this risk assesment is to assess whether the threats or security
vulnerabilities are relevant according to the security level specified by the security
goals. In our approach, we estimate the security risks based on the relevant
threats, their likelihood/impact [13] that the threats will materialize as real
attacks, any potential consequences on the system assets or possible severity of
an attack for the stakeholders, and the resulting impact of that adverse event
on the organization. We also consider the weakness that may occur when we
apply a specific countermeasure. In the case of a complex attack, we are always
facing conflicting situations where applying a countermeasure for a security event
can deactivate the application of other countermeasures. In our approach, we are
interested in the likelihood and the impact of each security threat. The likelihood
depends on five factors that we affect range and value as shown in Table 2 (e.g.,
an attack that affect a standard equipment is more likely to occur than an attack
that affect a specialized one, attackers can be better familiarized with standard
than specialized equipment). The ”likelihood” value is calculated from the sum
of the five factors values. The threat group likelihood is evaluated through the
sum obtained, likelihood increases with the decrease of the sum. For instance,
for a sum belonging to the interval [0,3] the likelihood value is considered the
most important “likely”.
4.4 System Architecture
The system architecture shows the composition of the system in terms of com-
ponents and interconnections between them. Through sensors and intrusion de-
tectors installed in the various components of the system, data collection part is
able to acquire security information as attack notifications and contextual data.
Each component in the system architecture is linked by a sensor to detect all ma-
licious activities that may occur, and actuators to apply different actions taken
by the PDP. From the automotive viewpoint, the system architecture is com-
posed of several components interlinked. The components of automotive system
architecture are equipped by a hardware security module (HSM) that provides
means to protect the plateform by protecting critical assets of the architecture.
Once the reasoning module has taken the right decision to respond to an attack,
the PEP is responsible for applying the countermeasure taken at the relevant
component in the architecture. The information in complex system is distributed
in all the system. Thus, in order to have a global view of all the security data,
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Threat Attack Impact
Group Factor Range Value Likelihood
Acquisition of Time < = 1 day 0
personal Expertise Proficient 2
information Knowledge Restricted 1 2 3
Opportunity Moderate 4 (Possible) (Medium)
Equipment Standard 0
Acquisition of Time < = 1 day 0
behavioural Expertise Proficient 2
details Knowledge Restricted 1 1 2
Opportunity Difficult 12 (Possible) (Medium)
Equipment Specialized 3
Denial of Time < = 1 day 0
transmission Expertise Layman 0
Knowledge Public 0 3 1
Opportunity Easy 1 (Likely) (Low)
Equipment Standard 0
Denial of Time < = 1 day 0
receipt Expertise Layman 0
Knowledge Public 0 3 2
Opportunity Easy 1 (Likely) (Low)
Equipment Standard 0
Table 2. Risk determination in an ITS system [13]
we need a data collector in our architecture which collects information from all
components sensors.
4.5 Data Collection
Data collection is the process of combining and associating information regard-
ing one or more entities considered in a knowledge framework. The aim of data
collector is to improve capability for detection, identification and characteriza-
tion of that entity. In modern decision support systems, information coming from
several sensors is fused in order to overcome the uncertainty in a case. The main
purpose of collection is to provide an overall picture of the significance of the in-
formation collected by different platforms to classify/identify the target entities
and to have a new data set containing the meaningful data. Data collection part
notifies the reasoning module when security events occur (individual or complex
attacks) and the contextual information on which they were produced.
Security events
Security events present all the types of attacks that may occur on a system and
harm its evolution in safety conditions. Nowdays attacks are becoming more
and more complex which complicate the task of security tools to prevent them.
And it becomes even more difficult in the case of coordinated attacks. A co-
ordinated attack is the collaboration of several attacking sources to achieve a
common goal. In order to achieve this goal, attacking sources, controlled by one
or several attacking entities, may cooperate by resource sharing, task allocation,
synchronization,etc. Many works focus on complex attack and the way to design
them as in [14] where the authors define a formal description of individual and
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coordinated attacks.
Contextual information
Data collector collects contextual information describing the circumstances in
which the attacks occurred. Those information are extracted by the reasoning
module that used it to reason and take the decision that best fits the context.
From the automotive point of view, we distinguish in this paper three types of
context :
- In-car
- V2V (Vehicule to Vehicule)
- V2I/I2V (Vehicule to Infrastructure / Infrastructure to Vehicle)
5 Dynamic Deployment of Security Policies
We present in this section the deployment of our approach, described in the last
section. The security data (i.e., security event and contextual information) are
collected, by the data collector, through the sensors integrated at different layer
of system architecture. These data are extracted by the reasoning engine and
compared by the security rules defined in the security policies, to identify the
possible countermeasures to apply.
5.1 Evaluation of countermeasures
In some cases, the PDP can make the decision to apply two or more counter-
measures (especially in the case of complex attack) where one of them prevents
the execution of another countermeasure, or reduces the efficiency of its appli-
cation as described in section 5.4. Each countermeasure taken by the system,
may have one or several weakness points that can affect the reaction process
and the maintenance of the system in security conditions. We present in Table 3
some of the weaknesses of the potential countermeasures that may degrade the
overall security and safety of the system. Complex systems such as automotive
on-board system arhictecture are more vulnerable to coordinated and complex
attacks, due to the complexity of its components and the distributed nature of
the system. The attackers try to damage the system through the intrusion to
one or many components of the system.
5.2 An example of complex attack in automotive system
The coordinated attack described below requires a minimum number of Group of
Coordinating Attackers (GCA), and it inflicts damage to automotive ITS system
by executing two different attacks (Message Saturation (MS) and Manipulation
of Relayed ITS messages in route (MR)): A part of attackers saturates the ITS
server by sending a huge number of requests at the same time. While the ITS
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Security Countermeasure Limitations
Reduce frequency of beaconing and other
repeated messages
Safety-critical messages may not be re-
ceived quickly enough by affected vehicles
Add source identification (IP address
equivalent) in V2V messages
The desired principles of anonymity within
ITS are breached
May not be available in the existing stack
Limit message traffic to V2I/I2V when
infrastructure is available and implement
message flow control and station
registration
The coverage of the ITS infrastructure
would have to be extensive
The speed of response to an incident would
deteriorate (however, response times would
be deterministic)
Current IEEE 802.11 technologies do not
support flow control
Table 3. Security countermeasures and their limitations [1]
system is unable to process all the incoming messages, the other part of attack-
ers captures those messages as an ITS server and manipulates them. We use
the modelisation of complex attacks described in [14] to define an example of
complex attack in automotive system (CXA) corresponding to the type “Coor-
dinated Attack with Load Accumulation – CALA”. CALA is defined in [14] as a
coordinated attack in which attackers accumulate their capabilities. This offers
execution of the attack in a distributed and simultaneous way.
(CALA): CALA ComplexAttack (GCACXA, ITS)
minCXA = 17
ACXA = {network access(attackerID, ITS)}; A′CXA = {}
BCXA = {knows(attackerID, is on(ITS))}; B′CXA = {MS(ITS)))}
ΓCXA = {is on(ITS,MS(ITS))}; Γ ′CXA = {MS(ITS),MR(ITS)}
ACXA, BCXA and ΓCXA present the precondition predicates that have to be




CXA present the post-
condition predicates that become true after the action execution. The minCXA
value is obtained from the sum of the opportunity values of the threats involved
in the complex attack. Automotive experts define the opportunity value for at-
tacks as the number of attackers required to achieve the attack. In this case, we
have two different attacks (MS and MR) with the opportunity values of each
one is 12 and 5, the resulting minCXA value is 17.
5.3 System reaction and inconsistency resolution
To mitigate this complex attack, we apply the approach defined in section 4:
- We start by defining, for each security event, the rationale behind each pos-
sible countermeasure as presented in Table 4, where we have defined the
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priorities for “Message saturation” threat, we start with the “in-car” con-
text then “V2V” context, and finally “V2I/I2V” context:
Context Rule Countermeasure Reason Attack
In-car
1 Reduce frequency of beaconing and other re-
peated messages
Performance 2,3
2 Add source identification (IP address equiva-








2 Add source identification (IP address equiva-




1 Reduce frequency of beaconing and other re-
peated messages
Performance 2,3




3 Limit message traffic to V2I/I2V and imple-
ment station registration
Filtering 1,2
2 Add source identification (IP address equiva-




1 Reduce frequency of beaconing and other re-
peated messages
Performance 2,3
Table 4. Priority order between reasons for message saturation threat
These requirements are defined in a formal way as following:
rule1 : countermeasure(reduce frequency)← threat(message saturation)
rule2 : countermeasure(add source)← threat(message saturation)
rule3 : countermeasure(limit traffic)← threat(message saturation)
We include the incompatibility predicate defined in Definition 3 to ensure that
different countermeasure cannot be part of the same acceptable argument:
conflict independent(countermeasure(reduce frequency),
countermeasure(add source)) ∧ conflict independent(countermeasure
(limit traffic), countermeasure(reduce frequency)) ∧ conflict
independent(countermeasure(limit traffic), countermeasure(add source)).
This conflict is resolved through the priority predicate which define the rationale
priority order:
priority(1, rule1, incar, performance) :
rule1← threat(message saturation) ∧ context(incar)
priority(2, rule2, incar, authenticity) :
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rule2← threat(message saturation) ∧ context(incar)
priority(3, rule3, incar, filtering) :
rule3← threat(message saturation) ∧ context(incar)
- According to the complex attack (CXA), we present in the Table 5, the best
countermeasure to apply corresponding to the reason having the higher pri-











may not be received
quickly enough by af-
fected vehicles
(1,3)





Availability A subverted legitimate
ITS-S possess all of the
necessary algorithms to
compute a valid check-
sum for a maliciously
modified message
(2,3)
Table 5. Default countermeasures configuration for complex attack
When the system applies the “Reduce frequency of beaconing and other re-
peated messages” countermeasure, the safety-critical messages may not be re-
ceived quickly enough by affected vehicles. Thus, the system is not able to include
a non-cryptographic checksum of the message in each message sent, which is the
countermeasure for “Manipulation of relayed ITS messages in route” threat.
The weakness of the “Message saturation” countermeasure affects the treatment
of the second security event which can be detected through conflict dependent
predicate defined in Definition 4:
conflict dependent(countermeasure(reduce frequency), countermeasure
(checksum))
To resolve this conflict, the reasoning engine refers to the risk analysis part
to identify which security threat has the greatest likelihood/impact value.
prefer(threat(manipulation ITS messages), threat(message saturation)←
like impact(manipulation ITS messages) > like impact(message saturation)
The prefer predicate inform the reasoning engine about the most important
threat from the threats having conflictual countermeasures. The processing of
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the “Manipulation of relayed ITS messages in route” is more important than
the “Message saturation” thread because of the likelihood/impact values. We
are confronted here to a conflict between two countermeasures. Applying the
best countermeasure for each security event is impossible, that is why we re-
fer to Table 4 and we pass to the second possible countermeasure for “Message
saturation” which ensures Data-source authenticity. We present in Table 6 the




Countermeasure Reason Weakness Likelihood
/ impact















Availability A subverted legitimate
ITS-S possess all of the
necessary algorithms to
compute a valid check-
sum for a maliciously
modified message
(2,3)
Table 6. Countermeasures adopted for complex attack
As we can see in Table 6, the application of each countermeasure of MS and
MR does not affect the execution of the other one. We consider this configuration
as the best that system can apply to maintain the system in safe conditions and
offer better performance.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In order to protect system from modern attacks, it is necessary to have a dynamic
and intelligent enforcement of security policies. We consider the argumentative
logic driven system the most appropriate to achieve this objective. In this work
we showed how to improve the existing argumentation framework, we proposed a
new approach that allows us to consider the context of security situations in order
to take the suitable and dynamic decisions. We are currently working to include
the case of dependancies between system components and other functional and
non functional requirements of the system. More specifically, we are designing an
approach that consider the system dependancies in reasoning while considering
other requirements such as performance, cost, etc.
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